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An ever-increasing amount of personal information about the habits, actions,
beliefs, and opinions of individuals is collected and stored by organisations. A new
generation of computers using sophisticated algorithms can process this mass of
raw data into valuable records that can be then sold for a variety of purposes. Data
from retail “loyalty” cards or credit cards might be processed in order to understand
an individual’s consumption preferences and habits, which would be of significant
interest to marketers. 
Online commercial transactions depend on both the creation and availability
of unprecedented and extensive data about individuals . . . [this] pushes a
dramatic increase in the importance of data privacy issues for consumers,
business, and society.1
Data collected by telecoms, airlines, and credit card companies might be processed
by a state in order to try to uncover the movements of terror cells. A broad spec-
trum of data might be processed to develop very detailed profiles of single individ-
uals to target them in an electoral campaign. The value — economic or other-
wise — of processed data is immense, and so creates tremendous incentives for
both the state and the private sector to collect as much personal data about individ-
uals as they can.
Naturally, there are corresponding incentives for individuals to learn just
when, how, and why this data is being collected and processed. In response to pub-
lic demand, some governments have pushed for data protection regimes to combat
potential abuses in the collection and processing of personal information. The Eu-
ropean Union’s Data Protection Directive2 offers comparatively high levels of con-
trol to individuals over their personal information and is backed up by strong en-
forcement mechanisms; the Directive represents the current high-water mark of
data protection. The Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation group (APEC) has re-
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1 Joseph Reidenberg, “E-Commerce and Transatlantic Privacy” (2001) 38 Hous. L. Rev.
717 at 719.
2 EC, Council Directive 95/46/EC of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals
with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data,
[1995] O.J. L 281/31 [Directive].
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cently adopted a more business-friendly “Privacy Framework”3; Google has led the
way in pushing this Framework as a model for a new global consensus.4 The EU
and APEC approaches represent two different ways of thinking about the purpose
of privacy rights in personal information (a.k.a. “informational privacy” or “data
privacy”). The European approach sees integrity and control over information
about oneself as inherent to human dignity; informational privacy is treated as a
fundamental right subject only to limited restrictions. In contrast, the approach
evinced by APEC is a market-oriented cost/benefit calculus; control over personal
information is seen as a beneficial policy goal when it can increase consumer confi-
dence and promote economic growth — the implication being that it can also more
easily give way in the face of competing economic arguments. These two ap-
proaches — one grounded in the language of rights, the other in the language of
markets — result in significant differences in both the substantive and procedural
protections each regime creates. This article argues that the two approaches are
incompatible, and the tension this creates is revealed in the rules regarding the
transfer of personal data from Europe to third countries.
Article 25 of the Directive requires the European Commission to determine
that “adequate” data protection laws are in place in third states before personal data
collected in the EU can be transferred outside its borders. Under Articles 29 and 30,
an independent “Working Party” is created to advise the Commission on the level
of data protection in third states. According to the Working Party’s approach, an
“adequate” data protection regime is one which meets a particular core of substan-
tive and procedural protections. This paper suggests that if the APEC Framework
were to be implemented as domestic legislation in an APEC Member economy, any
such legislation would not meet this core; the Commission, therefore, should not
consider any future legislation modelled on the APEC Framework to be “ade-
quate,” barring significant upgrades to its provisions. Given this apparent inade-
quacy, I also consider whether the American “Safe Harbor”5 agreement with the
EU could represent an alternative approach upon which negotiation between APEC
and the EU could be based. However, I ultimately reject this on both practical and
ideological grounds. The Commission ought instead to lobby for domestic legisla-
tion in APEC Member economies that is truly “adequate,” and until those econo-
mies implement such sufficiently robust data protection regimes, rely upon indivi-
dual contractual measures6 between EU-based and APEC-based organizations to
ensure the adequate protection of transmitted personal information.
3 APEC, Privacy Framework Doc. No. 205-SO-01.2 (2005), online: APEC
<http://www.apec.org> [APEC Framework].
4 In September 2007, Google’s Chief Privacy Counsel described the APEC Framework
as “the most promising foundation” upon which to build a global set of privacy laws
for personal information. Peter Fleisher, The Need for Global Privacy Standards, on-
line: Peter Fleischer: Privacy? <http://PeterFleischer.blogspot.com/2007/09/need-for-
Global-Privacy-Standards.html/>.
5 US Department of Commerce, Issuance of Safe Harbor Principles and Transmission to
the European Commission 65 Fed. Reg. No. 142 (2000) [Safe Harbor].
6 Directive, supra note 2, Art. 26(2).
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In support of the contention that the APEC Framework or legislation modelled
upon it cannot be considered an “adequate” data protection regime, this article will
first trace the competing theoretical approaches to privacy that the APEC Frame-
work and the EU Directive represent, and will then outline the major substantive
and procedural protections each regime offers. The potential adequacy of the APEC
Framework will then be assessed from the perspective of the requirements outlined
by the Working Party, by reflecting on both the stated policies and past recommen-
dations it has made to the Commission regarding data protection regimes in third
states.
I. PRIVACY AND CONTROL OF PERSONAL INFORMATION
Reilly suggests that it was the process of industrialisation that led to the first
Western legal recognition of privacy: the development of photography, radio, and
widely read newspapers created an increased threat to an individual’s privacy
through public dissemination of information about his/her life.7 Responding to
these developments in the United States at the end of the 19th century, Warren and
Brandeis argued that an individual should have the “right to be let alone” and the
“right to one’s personality.”8 More than one hundred years on, privacy, as a legal
concept, has diversified and expanded in myriad ways beyond this relatively nar-
row view; this article does not, however, seek to define its precise contours and
limits. Rather, it is premised on the idea that at least one aspect of privacy is the
ability of individuals to have at least some level of control over when and how their
“personal” information is recorded and processed; this we can term as “informa-
tional privacy” or “data privacy.”
Fried, for example, believes that privacy “is not simply the absence of infor-
mation about us in the minds of others; rather it is the control we have over infor-
mation about ourselves” [emphasis in original].9 Miller thinks “the basic attribute
of an effective right of privacy is the individual’s ability to control the circulation
of information relating to him.”10 A widely-accepted variant is put forth by Westin,
who argues that “privacy is the claim of individuals, groups or institutions to deter-
mine for themselves when, how and to what extent information about them is com-
municated to others.”11 This is perhaps the liberal claim to informational privacy
par excellence — it locates the key element of privacy as the power of the indivi-
dual to choose when and how she will distribute her personal information. Informa-
tion that is properly deemed as attracting a privacy interest is generally considered
beyond the reach of other individuals or the state, creating a zone of privacy that
allows the individual to fully exercise her autonomy and have her dignity, as a
person, respected.
7 Robert A. Reilly, “Conceptual Foundations of Privacy: Looking Backward before Step-
ping Forward” (1999) 6:2 Rich. J.L. & Tech. 6 at 7.
8 Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, “The Right to Privacy” (1890) 4:5 Harv. L. Rev.
193 at 215.
9 Charles Fried, “Privacy” (1967) 77 Yale L.J. 475 at 482.
10 Arthur Miller, The Assault on Privacy (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press,
1971) at 25.
11 Alan F. Westin, Privacy and Freedom (New York: Atheneum, 1967) at 7.
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In legislative terms, this control may take the form of substantive rules regard-
ing when and how the state, corporations, or other organisations may collect and
process personal information, and associated procedural rules to ensure effective
enforcement. Precisely how much control individuals should be given is, of course,
a matter of strenuous debate, and that is reflected in the approaches to data privacy
outlined here.
The EU approach positions data privacy as an inherent human right that can
only be limited in rare situations; in contrast, the APEC approach eschews the lan-
guage of rights entirely, instead treating data privacy as a policy interest aimed at
ensuring continued growth in an increasingly internet-based economy. These are
fundamentally different normative approaches: are privacy rules simply part of a
broader economic policy designed to promote growth, or do they exist to guarantee
a human right that helps to promote individuality, dignity, and autonomy? The
APEC Framework takes the former approach, positioning privacy in personal infor-
mation as a policy that is relatively easily balanced against competing economic
interests. It treats a (limited) level of control over one’s own personal information
as an instrumental good that can remedy imbalances in the “information market-
place,” since in the absence of appropriate regulation it is argued that: 
[T]he company . . . does not suffer losses from the disclosure of private in-
formation. Because customers often will not learn of the overdisclosure,
they may not be able to discipline the company effectively. In economic
terms, the company internalizes the gains from using the information but
can externalize some of the losses and so has a systematic incentive to
overuse it.12
On this account, data privacy rules can perform a regulatory function that
forces business to take better account of the interest consumers have in their per-
sonal information. Those who see privacy as essentially a regulatory tool are fearful
of the costs that a more robust form of legislated privacy might impose on business.
For example, Walker argues that higher regulatory burdens threaten to chill the
creation of innovative goods and services and even alter social values, making pri-
vacy “burdensome for individuals and a dicey proposition for society at large.”13
Individuals will pay more as a result of an increased regulatory burden on corpora-
tions, less choice, and have less opportunity to receive tailored services. Walker
feels that even tailored advertising is ultimately to the benefit of consumers be-
cause they are more likely to receive advertisements of interest to them, and be-
cause it reduces the marketing costs of business, with the savings passed on to
consumers.14 The APEC Framework reflects similar thinking, treating informa-
tional privacy as valuable only to the extent that it can increase consumer confi-
dence. Its provisions belie a normative approach that sees data privacy rules as
having the potential to stimulate growth, but if the rules created are too robust, they
risk having the opposite effect by being burdensome on business. The extent of
12 Peter P. Swire & Robert E. Litan, None of Your Business: World Data Flows, Elec-
tronic Commerce, and the European Privacy Directive (Washington, DC: Brookings
Institution Press, 1998) at 8.
13 Kent Walker, “The Costs of Privacy” (2001) 25 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 87 at 88.
14 Ibid. at 90.
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control over personal information granted to individuals is, therefore, always to be
balanced between these two concerns. Beneficial as this may be for business, this
utilitarian calculus lacks an understanding of how and why data privacy is impor-
tant not only to the human pocketbook, but to human dignity and autonomy.
In contrast, the Directive gives birth to informational privacy not via the lan-
guage of the market, but through the language of rights, reflecting both the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights15 and the UN Universal Declaration of Human
Rights.16 It is a treatment based on a deeper moral argument, one perhaps closer to
Warren and Brandeis’ notion of the “right to one’s personality,” even if made in an
entirely different context. It argues that privacy includes a significant level of con-
trol over personal information, and while this may indeed be beneficial in reducing
transaction costs and increasing consumer confidence, non-economic interests in-
form the bulk of the reasons for the existence and extent of this control. Proponents
of this “deeper” understanding of data privacy argue that control over personal in-
formation is a necessary component of human dignity and autonomy.
While Warren and Brandies did not explicitly define what the “right to one’s
personality” was, they seem to suggest that there is some core of the self that ought
to be protected by privacy. This is a commonly held position, though not there is
dispute over the phrasing and over what precisely the “core” of a person is. Blous-
tein, for example, believes that “inviolate personality” “defines man’s essence as a
unique and self-determining being” and that “this is in some sense a spiritual inter-
est rather than an interest in property or reputation.”17 When privacy violations
threaten to damage the “inviolate personality” of individuals, he argues, the law
needs to respond in order to protect human dignity and individuality.18 For Reiman,
privacy is “a social ritual by means of which an individual’s moral title to his exis-
tence is conferred.”19 By this, I take him to mean that being granted privacy rights
allows individuals to understand that some aspects of the self are theirs, and theirs
alone, and this understanding is key to individuals seeing themselves as, in fact,
“individuals.” Reiman argues that individuals “must recognize that [they] have ex-
clusive moral rights to shape [their] destiny.”20 Privacy violations, therefore, are
those that “penetrate the private reserve of the individual” and “[destroy] the
self.”21 Wasserstrom agrees, suggesting that one plausible conception of what it is
to be a person is “the idea of an existence of a core of thoughts and feelings that are
15 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
4 November 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 at 223, Eur. T.S. 5 [ECHR], Art. 8.
16 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc. A/810 at 71
(1998).
17 Edward J. Bloustein, “Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean
Prosser” in F. D. Schoeman, ed., Philosophical Dimensions of Privacy: An Anthology
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984) 156–202 at 163, 187.
18 Ibid. at 178.
19 Jeffrey H. Reiman, “Privacy, Intimacy, and Personhood” in F. D. Schoeman, ed., Phil-
osophical Dimensions of Privacy: An Anthology (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1984) 300–316 at 310.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid. at 311.
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a person’s alone,” and so the required disclosure of these thoughts and feelings
diminishes personhood; privacy, therefore, protects against such disclosure.22
Moore argues that we ought to recognize a moral claim to control personal infor-
mation (and also control over access to oneself), because privacy is a “cultural uni-
versal necessity for our proper functioning.”23
Schoeman also believes that, in general, the protection of the self is a desirable
thing and that privacy “marks out something morally significant about what it is to
be a person.”24 He argues that there is evidence to suggest that privacy allows indi-
viduals to express the different dimensions of the self, not in the sense of multiple-
personality disorders, but rather in the sense that behaviour is not consistent, and
shifts across contexts.25 The notion of the protection of the self is conceptually
similar to notions of dignity, or respect for persons. Respecting human dignity
means, partially, respecting individuals as persons and, to that extent, it overlaps
with protection of the self or personhood. However, personhood refers exclusively
to the state of an individual — it is concerned with one person’s thoughts, beliefs,
freedoms, etc. In contrast, the concept of dignity implies concern not only for the
status of a single being, but also for the relationships in which he is embedded. In
other words, “personhood” is a state that an individual has, lacking a concern for
how that state is necessarily obtained, while “dignity” can only be achieved if one
is treated with dignity by others; dignity is, therefore, premised not only on the
individual, but also upon relationships. For Miller, then, “our sense of dignity de-
rives from our right to be individuals while co-existing in one society.”26 For Post,
“dignity depends upon intersubjective norms that define the forms of conduct that
constitute respect between persons.”27 Benn also recognizes the relational compo-
nent of dignity, suggesting that, according an individual, dignity means respecting
her as an actual or potential “chooser,” an individual attempting to navigate her
own course through life.28 Respecting dignity, therefore, requires us “to take ac-
count of the way in which [another individual’s] enterprise might be affected by
[our] own decisions.”29
22 Richard A. Wasserstrom, “Privacy: Some Arguments and Assumptions” in F. D.
Schoeman, ed., Philosophical Dimensions of Privacy: An Anthology (New York: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1984) 317–345 at 322.
23 Adam D. Moore, “Toward Informational Privacy Rights” (2007) 44 San Diego L. Rev.
809 at 817.
24 Ferdinand David Schoeman, “Privacy and Intimate Information” in F. D. Schoeman,
ed., Philosophical Dimensions of Privacy: An Anthology (New York: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 1984) 403–418 at 404.
25 Ibid., at 410.
26 Jeremy A. Miller, “Dignity as a New Framework Replacing the Right to Privacy”
(2007) 30:1 Thomas Jefferson L. Rev. 1 at 2
27 Robert C. Post, “Three Concepts of Privacy” (2000) 89 Geo. L.J. 2087 at 2092.
28 Stanley I. Benn, “Privacy, Freedom, and Respect for Persons” in F. D. Schoeman, ed.,
Philosophical Dimensions of Privacy: An Anthology (New York: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 1984) 223–244 at 229.
29 Ibid.
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Fried claims that choosing what to reveal about ourselves goes to the core of
our ability to engage fully with others, arguing that “privacy in its dimension of
control over information is an aspect of liberty . . . [but also] is the necessary con-
text for . . . relationships of love, friendship, and trust.”30 But, the freedom to en-
gage must also imply the freedom to withdraw — Bloustein is concerned with the
damaging effects that a lack of privacy can have on the human psyche, arguing that
to be human means to have the ability to shield elements of one’s life from the gaze
of others: 
[T]he man who is compelled to live every minute of his life among others
and whose every need, thought, desire, fancy or gratification is subject to
public scrutiny, has been deprived of his individuality and human dignity.31
The EU Directive is premised on a similar understanding of informational pri-
vacy’s normative function — the idea that when information is gathered about our
habits, preferences, and lifestyles, and is processed without our consent or knowl-
edge in order to slice us into particular demographics, target markets, and threat
profiles, we are deprived of our individuality and dignity. Recognising this means
abandoning a market-driven approach to informational privacy as it posits that,
while there may, indeed, be costs to business associated with a strong right to infor-
mational privacy, non-economic reasons outweigh these costs. Since it comes from
the liberal language of rights and dignity, it is not surprising that the Directive cre-
ates a regulatory model that places the bulk of control over what kinds of informa-
tion can be held and processed, and for what purposes, in the hands of the individu-
als who make up the source of that information.
In contrast, market-oriented approaches such as the APEC Framework offer
only limited control over personal information to individuals and, therefore, do not
draw on the same normative groundings of a claim to privacy. When some control
over information is granted, it tends to be done so for the purposes of something
resembling consumer protection, rather than out of a desire to protect privacy. This
reflects an understanding of informational privacy that sees a degree of control over
personal information as a potentially beneficial interest for consumers, but one that
may often come at too high an economic price for business. As a result, substantive
protections in market-oriented models are relatively low and contain a significant
number of built-in exemptions, and there are no strong procedural mechanisms to
guarantee their enforcement. In contrast, rights-based models, such as the Direc-
tive, treat privacy in personal information as a fundamental right that should only
be limited in the most serious of instances, and ensure that this right is overseen on
a national level in each member State by an independent public data commissioner
and enforced by appropriate judicial mechanisms.
The gap between the protections that come out of these two normative ap-
proaches to informational privacy is significant. When comparing the EU Data Pro-
tection Directive and the APEC Privacy Framework, it soon becomes clear that
Framework cannot be considered an “adequate” data protection regime as contem-
plated by Article 25 of the Directive, because of this normative gulf. Absent con-
30 Fried, supra note 9 at 483-484.
31 Edward J. Bloustein, “Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean
Prosser” (1964) 39 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 962 at 1003.
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tractual agreements of the sort envisaged by Article 26,32 the transfer of personal
data from EU Member states to organisations in third states with privacy laws mod-
elled up on the APEC Framework ought, therefore, to be prohibited.
II. THE APEC PRIVACY FRAMEWORK
(a) Background
The APEC Framework was the culmination of more than five years of negoti-
ation between APEC Member economies on the protection of personal data within
the region. In 1998, APEC announced a broad plan to use information technology
to assist regional economies in modernising. This included an agreement that: 
Government and business should co-operate to develop and implement tech-
nologies and policies, which build trust and confidence in safe, secure and
reliable communication, information and delivery systems, and which ad-
dress issues including privacy, authentication and consumer protection.33
The following year APEC established the Electronic Commerce Steering
Group (ECSG) in order to help realise these goals. The ESCG created a Data Pri-
vacy Subgroup in 2003, which released a draft of the APEC Framework in 2004;
APEC Ministers formally approved the APEC Framework the following year.
The Preamble to the APEC Framework states that the APEC Member econo-
mies recognise “the importance of protecting information privacy and maintaining
information flows among economies in the Asia-Pacific region and among their
trading partners.”34 It soon becomes clear from the rest of the Preamble that the
focus of the whole APEC Framework is squarely on maintaining those valuable
flows. Informational privacy is envisioned as a positive thing only insofar as it does
not jeopardize economic growth; its purpose is “to improve consumer confidence
and ensure the growth of electronic commerce.”35 Indeed, the Preamble is careful
to note that overly rigorous protections may have “adverse implications for global
business” and, therefore, any data protection regime must “account for [this] new
realit[y].”36 This normative approach to informational privacy treats it as useful for
the purposes of consumer protection, eschewing the language of “rights” entirely;
this has dramatic consequences for both the substantive and procedural components
32 Art. 26(2):
[...] a Member State may authorize a transfer or a set of transfers of
personal data to a third country which does not ensure an adequate
level of protection within the meaning of Article 25 (2), where the
controller adduces adequate safeguards with respect to the protection
of the privacy and fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals and
as regards the exercise of the corresponding rights; such safeguards
may in particular result from appropriate contractual clauses.
33 APEC, APEC Economic Leaders Declaration: Strengthening the Foundations for
Growth (18 November 1988) at 16, online: Asian LII
<http://www.asianlii.org/apcc/other/agrmt/6aeldstffg689>.
34 APEC Framework, supra note 3, Part i(1).
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid., Part i(3).
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(outlined in the following section) of the APEC Framework, ultimately meaning it
cannot be considered “adequate.”
(b) Structure of the APEC Framework
(i) Substantive Protections
The APEC Framework groups its substantive provisions under nine broad
headings: preventing harm, notice, collection limitation, uses of personal informa-
tion, choice, integrity of personal information, security safeguards, access and cor-
rection, and accountability.37
(A) Preventing Harm
Individuals have a legitimate expectation of privacy in their personal informa-
tion, and protections should be designed to prevent harm to individuals because of
the wrongful collection or misuse of that information. Remedies for privacy in-
fringements ought to be designed to prevent further harm to individuals and should
be proportionate to the likelihood and severity of the threat that exists because of
the use of that information.
(B) Notice
Individuals should be able to know what information is collected about them
and for what purpose it is used. Holders of collected information are to take all
reasonably practicable steps to ensure that notice is provided either before or at the
time of collection of the information, or if this is not possible (for example, where
the information is not obtained directly, but through a third party), as soon after as
is practicable. It is not necessary to give notice where the information in question is
in the public domain, or is information that identifies an individual in a professional
capacity.
(C) Collection Limitation
The collection of information must be limited by reference to the purposes for
which it is collected. Collection must be relevant to the stated purposes, and collec-
tion methods must be lawful and fair and conducted with notice to, or the consent
of, the individual concerned. There are, however, circumstances in which providing
notice to, or obtaining consent of, individuals would be inappropriate, such as dur-
ing a public health emergency.
(D) Uses of Personal Information
Personal information can only be used to fulfil the purposes of collection and
other compatible or related purposes. However, information can be used for differ-
ent purposes than those stated during collection in three circumstances — with the
consent of the individual, where it is necessary to provide a product/service re-
quested by the individual, or by the authority of law. A compatible or related pur-
37 Ibid., Part iii(I-IX).
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pose is to be determined by asking whether the extended usage stems from, or is in
furtherance of, the original purpose of collection.
(E) Choice
Individuals are to be provided with choice in relation to the collection, use,
transfer, and disclosure of their personal information, to be exercised through clear,
accessible, easily understandable, and affordable mechanisms. These mechanisms
may not be necessary where the information is collected from the public domain, or
in relation to information that identifies an individual in a professional capacity, or
in certain employer-employee relationships.
(F) Integrity of Personal Information
There is an obligation on holders of collected personal information to maintain
the accuracy and completeness of records, to the extent necessary for the purposes
of the use of the information.
(G) Security Safeguards
Individuals are entitled to expect that their information is protected. Safe-
guards should be proportional to the likelihood and severity of the harm threatened,
the sensitivity of the information and the context in which it is held, and should be
subject to periodic review.
(H) Access and Correction
While the ability to access and correct information held about oneself is a cen-
tral aspect of privacy protection, it is not an absolute right. Individuals should be
able to obtain from the information controller confirmation about whether informa-
tion is being held about them, have that information communicated to them (within
a reasonable time and in a reasonable manner), challenge the accuracy of that infor-
mation and (if appropriate) have it rectified or deleted. However, access and oppor-
tunity for correction may not be provided where the burden or expense of doing so
would be disproportionate to the risks to the individual’s privacy; this is so where
there are legal or security concerns, to protect confidential commercial information,
or where access would violate the informational privacy of third parties. If a re-
quest for access is denied, the individual should be provided with reasons for the
denial and an opportunity to appeal.
(I) Accountability
Personal information controllers should be accountable for complying with
measures taken to give effect to the principles embodied by the APEC Framework.
When personal information is to be transferred, the controller should obtain the
consent of the individual or take reasonable steps to ensure that the recipient will
protect the information in a manner consistent with the APEC Framework.
(ii) Procedural Protections
Of course, as a policy document the APEC Framework is not legally enforcea-
ble on its own, but even if we were to imagine it being implemented as domestic
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legislation in a APEC Member economy, it does not prescribe the procedural pro-
tections necessary to ensure individuals could enforce their rights. Indeed, it specif-
ically suggests that a Member economy could implement the substantive provisions
in any manner it saw fit.38 This is a significant weakness and, again, reflects a
normative conception of informational privacy as primarily a market-oriented regu-
latory tool rather than as a human right.
III. THE EU DATA PROTECTION DIRECTIVE
(a) Background
Western Europe has a comparatively long history of data protection laws, cul-
minating with the Directive. The OECD Privacy Guidelines represented the first
transatlantic bargain related to privacy protections for personal data; OECD mem-
ber nations were to follow them when developing their own national legislation.39
However, practice did not follow theory and differing interpretations of these prin-
ciples between the United States and a number of the European nations led to di-
verging data privacy standards. The European Council subsequently tightened stan-
dards in Europe by essentially making the OECD guidelines enforceable, requiring
countries to establish both sanctions and remedies for informational privacy viola-
tions;40 the Directive specifically acknowledges that it is designed to amplify the
protections agreed upon by the Council.41 It is telling that the APEC Framework
bears a strong resemblance to the OECD guidelines that Europe deemed
insufficient.
(b) Structure of the EU Data Protection Directive
The Directive lays out its priorities early on and relies on the language of
rights to do so. The recital stresses that “data-processing systems are designed to
serve [people] . . . [and] must respect their fundamental rights and freedoms, nota-
bly the right to privacy.”42 While acknowledging that “personal data should be able
to flow freely from one Member State to another,” the recital notes that this should
only occur where the “fundamental rights of individuals” are safeguarded.43 Both
the substantive and procedural protections of the Directive are far more stringent
than those envisaged by the APEC Framework, reflecting a deep concern for infor-
mational privacy that extends beyond any economic benefit it may bring through an
increase in consumer confidence. This evidences an important difference in the
purposes of the APEC Framework and the Directive; even though the Directive
38 Ibid., Part iv.
39 OECD, Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal
Data (1980), online: OECD <http://www.oecd.org/document/20/0,3343,
en_2649_34255_15589524_1_1_1_1,00.html>.
40 Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the
Automatic Processing of Personal Data, 28 January 1981, ETS-108, online: Council of
Europe <http://www.conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/treaties/Html/108.htm>.
41 Directive, supra note 2, 11th recital.
42 Ibid., 2nd recital.
43 Ibid., 3rd recital.
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acknowledges the economic value of processed data, “it is not easy to extract from
[the] Directive any purpose other than the protection of privacy.”44 The Directive
does not dispute that data flows have important economic benefits; indeed, it en-
courages such flows. However, it aims to ensure that both the collection and
processing of the data that makes up those valuable flows takes place in accordance
with strict guidelines, including an attempt to ensure that switching jurisdictions
cannot circumvent those guidelines. While “cross-border flows of personal data are
necessary to the expansion of international trade,” the importance of informational
privacy as a right means that “the transfer of personal data to a third country which
does not ensure an adequate level of protection must be prohibited.”45
(i) Chapter I — General Provisions
The opening Chapter outlines the objective and applicability of the Directive,
along with the definitions of terms of art it uses. It notes that the Directive applies
to all processing of personal data wholly or partially by automatic means, but there
are exceptions for household activity, national security, criminal law, etc. The ob-
ject of the Directive is to “protect the fundamental rights and freedoms of natural
persons, and in particular their right to privacy with respect to the processing of
personal data.”46 From the start then, the emphasis of the Directive is squarely on
privacy rights rather than economic growth, and this positions the right to data pri-
vacy as something much more than a regulatory tool.
(ii) Chapter II — General Rules on the Lawfulness of the Processing of
Personal Data
Chapter II contains the substantive rules relating to the processing of personal
data that the Directive requires Member States to adopt, and is divided into nine
sections.47 When compared to their counterparts in the APEC Framework, the Di-
rective’s substantive principles are more detailed, create broader rights, and contain
fewer exemptions.
Section I — Principles Relating to Data Quality
Member States must provide that all personal data for specific purposes is
processed lawfully and fairly — that it is adequate, relevant, and not excessive, and
is kept in a form that permits the identification of data subjects for no longer than is
necessary.
Section II — Criteria for Making Data Processing Legitimate
Personal data can be processed only if the data subject has given her consent,
except in particular defined scenarios (i.e. it is necessary for the performance of a
44 Johnson v. Medical Defence Union Ltd., [2007] EWCA Civ 262, ¶16, Buston L.J
(C.A.).
45 Directive, supra note 2, 56th and 57th recitals [emphasis added].
46 Ibid., Ch. I, Art. 1.
47 Ibid., Ch. II, Arts. 5–21.
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contract to which the subject is party, or is necessary for compliance with legal
obligations, etc.).
Section III — Special Categories of Processing
The processing of personal data revealing ethnicity, political opinions, relig-
ious beliefs, trade-union membership, or relating to the subject’s health or sex life
is prohibited except in particular defined scenarios. Member states are required to
provide exemptions for the processing of personal data carried out solely for jour-
nalistic purposes or the purpose of artistic/literary expression where it is necessary
to reconcile the right of privacy with rules governing freedom of expression.
Section IV — Information to be Given to the Data Subject
Data controllers must provide data subjects with their identity, the purposes of
the processing, and any other information that is necessary to guarantee fair
processing. Where the data about the subject was not obtained from the subject, the
controller must disclose this same information to the subject no later than the time
when the data was first disclosed to the controller.
Section V — The Data Subject’s Right of Access to Data
The data subject has the right to obtain from the controller confirmation of
data held about the subject that is being processed and its purposes, the end recipi-
ents of this data, the source of the data, and the logic involved in any automatic
processing in the case of automated decisions made about the subject. The data
subject also has the right to block or rectify the processing of data that does not
comply with the Directive, and to require the controller to inform any third parties
who have already received the data of this block or rectification, so long it does not
prove impossible or require disproportionate effort.
Section VI — Exemptions and Restrictions
Member States may choose to adopt legislative measures to restrict the scope
of the obligations and rights under the Directive when necessary to safeguard cer-
tain vital interests (national security, the rights and freedoms of others, etc.).
Section VII — The Data Subject’s Right to Object
The data subject may object to the processing of personal data in certain cir-
cumstances (i.e. where the data is processed for the purposes of direct marketing).
Member States are required to grant to every person the right not to be a subject of
a decision based solely on automated processing of data where that decision pro-
duces legal effects or is of significant effect.
Section VIII — Confidentiality and Security of Processing
Data controllers must implement appropriate technical and organisational
measures in order to protect personal data against destruction, loss, or unauthorised
disclosure or access.
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Section IX — Notification
Any data controller must inform the relevant public supervisory authority
prior to carrying out any processing operation, except in certain specified condi-
tions. The controller must provide information regarding the purpose of the
processing, the type of data to be processed, the end recipients of the data, and any
proposed transfer outside the European Union. Member States shall determine the
risks any processing operation might pose, prior to the start of that operation, by
means of checks carried out by the public authority upon receipt of notification
from a controller. All processing operations should be publicized and listed in a
public registry.
(iii) Chapters III–VII (excluding Chapter IV)
The remaining chapters are largely procedural. Chapter III deals with judicial
remedies, liability, and sanctions for any breach of the Directive’s provisions.
Chapter V directs Member States to draw up relevant codes of conduct for control-
lers to follow. Chapter VI mandates the creation of a fully independent public au-
thority (i.e. a national Data Protection Commissioner) responsible for monitoring
the application of the Directive in their respective Member States. These authorities
are to have investigative and enforcement powers, and the power to engage in legal
proceedings. Chapter VII outlines how the Directive is to be implemented.
(iv) Chapter IV: Transfer of Personal Data to Third Countries
The Member States shall provide that the transfer to a third country of per-
sonal data which are undergoing processing or are intended for processing
after transfer may take place only if . . . the third country in question ensures
an adequate level of protection.48
Where the Commission finds that the protection offered by third countries is
not “adequate,” Member States are required to take measures necessary to prevent
the transfer of personal data to the third country in question, except in a limited
range of circumstances.49 Adequacy is to be assessed on a case-by-case basis, and
to this end Article 29 creates a standing “Working Party on the Protection of Indi-
viduals with regard to the Processing of Personal Data” (hereafter, the “Working
Party”) tasked with the responsibility of, inter alia, giving the Commission opin-
ions on the level of protection in third countries. The Commission is not obliged to
accept the recommendations of the Working Party, though clearly they carry great
weight and the Commission is required to inform the Working Party of the action it
has taken in response to its reccommendations.
IV. ANALYSIS: IS THE APEC FRAMEWORK “ADEQUATE”
UNDER THE WORKING PARTY’S APPROACH?
The Working Party follows a two-stage process in making a determination of
adequacy: an analysis of the content of the rules applicable, and an analysis of the
48 Ibid., Ch. IV, Art. 25.
49 Ibid., Ch. IV, Art. 26.
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means for ensuring their effective application.50 Therefore, for a non-EU data pro-
tection regime to be considered adequate, it must meet a core of substantive and
procedural principles.
While adoption of the Framework by APEC Member economies is voluntary,
let us hypothetically assume that a Member economy currently lacking any data
protection legislation implemented the provisions of the APEC Framework into
their domestic legal order. Is it possible that such legislation could be considered
“adequate” within the meaning of Article 25, following the Working Party’s analyt-
ical framework? Unless a Member economy voluntarily decided to upgrade their
data protection laws beyond that required by the APEC Framework, the following
analysis suggests that the answer is “no.” The APEC Framework, as it stands, sets a
relatively low threshold for data protection laws, and does not conform to a major-
ity of either the substantive or procedural requirements of the Working Party for a
finding of adequacy.
(a) Core Substantive Principles Required for a Finding of “Adequacy”
by the Working Party
The Working Party will only find a third-state data protection regime to be
“adequate” within the meaning of Article 25 when it finds that it complies with the
following substantive principles: data is collected for limited and defined purposes;
data is of sufficient quality and is used proportionally for the purposes for which it
was collected; there is transparency about any collection and processing; there are
sufficient security measures; there are appropriate rights of access, rectification,
and opposition; there are rules regarding onward transfers; and there are particu-
larly stringent rules in special defined circumstances.
(i) The Purpose Limitation Principle
The Working Party has said that data should be processed for specific pur-
poses and only subsequently used in a manner not incompatible with those pur-
poses, except where an exemption could be justified as necessary in a democratic
society.
Principle IV of the APEC Framework deals with the uses to which collected
personal data can be put, holding that it may only be used to fulfil the purposes of
collection and other related or compatible purposes. The commentary to the APEC
Framework states that: 
[T]he fundamental criterion in determining whether a purpose is compatible
with or related to the stated purposes is whether the extended use stems
from or is in furtherance of such purposes.51
50 European Commission (Working Party on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to
the Processing of Personal Data), Working Document on the transfers of personal data
to third countries: Applying Articles 25 and 26 of the EU data protection directive,
(1998) DG XV D/5025/98 at 5, online: European Commission
<http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/docs/wpdocs/1998/wp12_en.pdf>
[Working Document].
51 APEC Framework, supra note 3, Part iii(IV)(19)(commentary).
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On the surface, then, the APEC Framework would seem to conform to the
requirements of the Purpose Limitation Principle, although there may be some con-
cern regarding some of the exemptions. While the Working Party has stated that the
only acceptable exemptions are the sort to be found in Article 13 of the Directive52
the APEC Framework includes seemingly less serious exemptions, such as where
an individual consents to unrelated uses, or when the unrelated use is necessary to
provide a product or service requested by a data subject. Such business-friendly
exemptions should alert us to the nature of the APEC Framework — it is designed
to provide fairly minimal standards of data protection that are enough to enhance
consumer confidence, but do not hamper the economic benefits of the free flow
information. In contrast, the Directive seeks to ensure that personal data can only
be used for a different purpose from that for which it was collected in situations
that are of serious public concern, reflecting the importance with which it treats
informational privacy as a human right.
(ii) The Data Quality and Proportionality Principle
To comply with this principle, the APEC Framework would have to ensure
that personal data is accurate and (where necessary) up-to-date, relevant, and not
excessive in relation to the purposes for which it is being processed. The relevant
Framework provision here is Principle VI, which relates to the integrity of personal
information, requiring it to be accurate, complete, and kept up-to-date to the extent
necessary for the purposes of use. It seems likely that this is sufficient to meet the
Working Party’s requirements. However, it is notable that there is no requirement
placed on data controllers to delete information that is no longer required; the re-
moval of outdated information would be the responsibility of the data subject,
under the right of access and rectification.
(iii) The Transparency Principle
To comply with this core principle, the APEC Framework must ensure that
individuals are provided with notification about the collection and processing of
their personal data, the identity of the data controller, and any other information
required to ensure fairness, subject only to limited exceptions similar to those in
Articles 11(2) and 13 of the Directive.53 The relevant Framework provision here is
Principle II, regarding notice. It holds that individuals should receive notice when
52 Under Art. 13, Member states may adopt exemptions where necessary for purposes of
national security, defence, public security, the preven-
tion/detection/investigation/prosecution of criminal offences or breaches of ethics for
regulated professions, important state-level economic or financial interests, a monitor-
ing/inspecting/regulating function connected with the exercise of official authority in
defined circumstances, and the protection of a data subject or any individual’s rights.
53 Under Article 11(2), where the data was not obtained from the individual directly, no
disclosure to the individual is required where in particular for processing for statistical
purposes or for the purposes of historical or scientific research, the provision of such
information proves impossible or would involve a disproportionate effort or if record-
ing or disclosure is expressly laid down by law (though appropriate safeguards must
still be created).
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their personal information is being collected, the purpose of the collection and who
will receive the information, the identity and location of the data controller, etc.
While this initially appears to conform to the Working Party’s requirements, there
are two concerns: one regarding the timing of the notice requirement, the other
regarding a series of exemptions granted to the processing of publicly-sourced
information.
Under the Directive, notice is to be given to the data subject at the time of
collection of the data (that is, prior to processing).54 Under the APEC Framework,
in contrast, it is possible for notice to be given “as soon after [collection] as is
practicable.”55 The commentary to the APEC Framework adds that the decision of
when precisely to provide notice should be “based on a consensus among APEC
Member economies.”56 Pounder points out that this consensus could very well be
one of commercial convenience rather than of fair treatment of data subjects.57 If
this were the case, then the entire notice principle is diminished in value, and sug-
gests that the APEC Framework fails to meet the Working Party’s core requirement
of transparency.
The exemptions listed in the APEC Framework also create problems for trans-
parency: it notes that it “may not be appropriate for personal information control-
lers to provide notice regarding the collection and use of publicly available infor-
mation.”58 Similarly, Principle V, which holds that individuals should be provided
with mechanisms to enable them to exercise choice in relation to the use and dis-
closure of their personal information, contains an exemption for data collected from
publicly available sources. Such exemptions for publicly-sourced information are
ill-advised because they fail to recognise the impact that exponential growth in
computing power will have on the processing of data. The increasing use of com-
puters to link previously disparate pieces of publicly available information and the
rapidly developing field of facial recognition poses new threats to personal privacy
that such exemptions do not recognise. For example, it is likely that under the
APEC Framework it would be entirely acceptable to compile a database that tracks
individuals as they are photographed on CCTV systems travelling through public
spaces, and tie this into any data they have provided about themselves on the In-
ternet, and not require any consent from the individuals in question. In contrast,
under the Directive and similarly comprehensive legislation, the vast majority of
publicly sourced information is still protected by the relevant privacy principles.
While information taken from a publicly-run and accessible register (i.e., a collec-
54 Directive, supra note 2, Ch. II, s. IV, Art. 10.
55 APEC Framework, supra note 3, Part iii(II)(16).
56 Ibid., Part iii(II)(15–17) (commentary).
57 Chris Pounder, “Why the APEC Privacy Framework is Unlikely to Protect Privacy”
Data Protection Quarterly, (2007) online: Out-law.com <http://out-
law.com/default.aspx?Page=8550>.
58 APEC Framework, supra note 3, Part iii(II)(17).
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tion of census records) is not protected,59 the collection and processing of photo-
graphs taken in public places would likely activate the Directive’s protections.60
In its analysis of Argentina’s privacy regime, the Working Party criticized an
exemption to the consent requirement for publicly-sourced information similar to
that found in the APEC Framework, stating it would only be acceptable if there
were additional rules that guaranteed that the processing of data from public
sources would not constitute a threat to the fundamental rights and freedoms of
individuals, particularly their right to privacy.61 There are, however, no similar ad-
ditional rules found in the APEC Framework that might serve as backup (for exam-
ple, by differentiating between different kinds of publicly-available data and requir-
ing notice/consent for certain types). The broader exemptions exist because they
are not seen as impacting upon the ability of the individual to participate in the
marketplace and, therefore, are of little concern to the APEC Framework’s drafters.
(iv) The Security Principle
This Working Party requires that sufficient technical and organisational secur-
ity measures be present given the nature of the processing in question. Principle VII
of the APEC Framework requires that data controllers protect the personal informa-
tion they hold against risks such as loss or unauthorized access, and the safeguards
should be proportionate to the likelihood and severity of the harm threatened. This
would seem to conform to the requirements of the Directive.
(v) The Rights of Access, Rectification, and Opposition
For the APEC Framework to meet this core requirement, as outlined by the
Working Party, it would have to ensure that the data subject has the right to obtain
a copy of any of their personal data that is being processed, and a right to correct
any errors in that data, subject only to the type of exemptions found in Article 13 of
the Directive, above. The relevant Framework principle is Principle VIII, which
relates to access and correction. Again, on the surface, it appears as though the
APEC Framework meets the requirements of the Directive, but the exemptions it
grants raise concerns. Principle VIII does provide that individuals should be able to
receive copies of their personal information from a data controller in a reasonably
fast and non-cost prohibitive manner, and further that they should be able to chal-
lenge the controller when errors are discovered. If the APEC Framework ended at
59 Directive, supra note 2, Ch. IV, Art. 26(1)(f).
60 This is an area of increasing concern; see for example a letter from the Privacy Com-
missioner of Canada to Google outlining her concerns regarding the automatic
photographing of individuals under Google’s “Streetview” Mapping Service, online:
Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada
<http://www.priv.gc.ca/media/let/let_070911_01_e.cfm>.
61 The Working Party concluded that Argentina did, in fact, provide such additional rules.
European Commission (Working Party on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to
the Processing of Personal Data), Opinion 4/2002 on the level of protection of personal
data in Argentina (2002) 11081/02/EN/Final, at 16-17, online: European Commission
<http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2002/wp63_en.pdf> (last
accessed 14 May 2009) [WP Opinion on Argentina].
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that point, all would likely be well from the perspective of determining adequacy.
However, the APEC Framework goes on to list several exemptions from the right
of access and notification.
While the Working Party has stated that limited exemptions for matters of
national interest are acceptable in this context, the APEC Framework conceives of
a broader exemption in any situation where the burden or expense of allowing ac-
cess and correction would be “disproportionate” to the risks to the individual’s pri-
vacy. Pounder notes that these exemptions tie into the APEC Framework’s
“preventing harm” principle, under which any available remedial measures and
specific obligations upon data processors are to be proportionate to the likelihood
and severity of the harm threatened by the collection.62 Pounder argues that this
means that where data processors do not perceive any particular harm to be likely,
then the exemptions in the APEC Framework (such as not requiring notice or ac-
cess) come into play, resulting in a counter-intuitive scenario: 
Access by the data subject to his or her own personal data can be refused if
there is little risk of harm to the data subject, yet the reason why the data
subject might want to seek access is to find out whether the processing is
causing him harm.63
Pounder notes that other data protection regimes, including the Directive, re-
ject this approach, and instead assume that it is the data subject that is best placed
to assess the risk of harm because the sensitivity of the data in question is a “sub-
jective assessment that [can] only be accurately judged by [the] data subject.”64
The APEC Framework seems to place greater emphasis on the needs of data
processors rather than on the rights of the data subjects and this, again, reflects a
different normative interpretation of informational privacy. The authors of the
APEC Framework seem to dispute that individuals have any deep and meaningful
concern in preventing the circulation of erroneous information about them because
there is no perceived impact on consumer confidence or on marketplace behaviour.
(vi) Restrictions on Onward Transfers
The Working Party requires that further transfers of personal data by the recip-
ient in the third country be permitted only where the next jurisdiction also features
data protection rules that are “adequate,” subject to exceptions similar to those out-
lined in Article 26 (above). This is, of course, necessary to ensure that the protec-
tions required by the Directive cannot be circumvented through multiple transfers
to jurisdictions with increasingly weaker data protection regulations. The Working
Party does not require something as rigorous as Article 25 in order to meet this
requirement. APEC could meet it by simply requiring individual contractual mea-
sures ensuring adequate levels of protection for onward transfers are guaranteed, as
is done in Article 26 of the Directive, in addition to both the Safe Harbor agreement
62 APEC Framework, supra note 3, Part iii(I)(14).
63 Pounder, supra note 57.
64 Ibid., Pounder referring to the Lindrop Committee Report on Data Protection (Cmnd
7341, paras. 18.24–18.27).
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and the Canadian data protection regime, PIPEDA.65 The APEC Framework, how-
ever, contains no rules whatsoever about onward transfer. Under the “Guidance for
International Implementation” provisions, Member economies are merely en-
couraged to develop cross-border privacy rules that adhere to the Principles of the
APEC Framework, so long as they do not create “unnecessary administrative and
bureaucratic burdens for business and consumers.”66
(vii) Special Situations
The Working Party has identified three situations in which additional protec-
tions may be required beyond these core substantive principles; these are situations
involving the processing of sensitive data, direct marketing, and automated indivi-
dual decisions. Sensitive data is data that reveals racial or ethnic origin, political
opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, health or sexual information, or infor-
mation relating to criminal records.67 Where this sort of data is involved, the Work-
ing Party requires that additional safeguards (such as explicit consent) be in place.
In the case of direct marketing, the individual should be able to opt-out entirely of
the processing of their data for such purposes. In the case of automated individual
decisions, the Working Party requires that the individual should have the right to
know the logic involved in the decision, and that other (unspecified) measures
should be taken to safeguard the individual’s legitimate interest.
The APEC Framework makes no distinction between different kinds of per-
sonal information, however, simply defining it as “any information about an identi-
fied or identifiable individual.”68 Faced with a similar lack of distinction in its anal-
ysis of the Canadian data protection regime, the Working Party found that
provisions in the Canadian legislation requiring organisations to take into account
the “sensitivity” of the data in question nonetheless met the requirement of ade-
quacy.69 Yet the APEC Framework falls short on this approach too, subsuming all
personal information into a single type and stating only that “where appropriate,
individuals should be provided with [the ability] to exercise choice in relation to the
use of that data.”70
The APEC Framework makes no reference whatsoever to any special provi-
sions for the use of personal information in direct marketing, in contrast to the
Working Party which argues that an individual ought to be able to opt out of any
such use — given the general pro-business orientation of the APEC Framework,
65 The Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, S.C. 2000, c. 5,
sched. 1, cl. 4.1.3 [PIPEDA].
66 APEC Framework, supra note 3, Part iv(B)(III)(48).
67 Directive, supra note 2, Ch. II, Art. 8.
68 APEC Framework, supra note 3, Part ii(9).
69 European Commission (Working Party on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to
the Processing of Personal Data), Opinion 2/2001 on the adequacy of the Canadian




70 APEC Framework, supra note 3, Part iii(V).
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this is unsurprising. Again, it is possible that such an option could be included
within the broader “choice” provisions of the fifth Framework principle, but it is
not specified. Finally, the APEC Framework makes no reference to the third special
case identified by the Working Party — automated decision making within the
meaning of Article 15 of the Directive.
(b) Core Procedural Principles Required for a Finding of “Adequacy”
by the Working Party
While in the EU data protection principles are implemented via statute and
supervised by an independent authority, this is not always the case elsewhere. Ac-
knowledging this, the Working Party has developed a scheme to allow a determina-
tion of the adequacy of procedural measures in both judicial and non-judicial con-
texts in third countries, based on three core objectives — good rule compliance, the
provision of assistance to data subjects in exercising their rights, and the provision
of appropriate redress to subjects who have suffered violations of the rules.
(i) Good Compliance with the Rules
A lack of judicial enforcement will not necessarily prevent a finding of ade-
quacy so long as there is generally good compliance with the rules that relate to the
enforcement of the substantive core principles. While no system is likely to achieve
100% compliance with the rules, a good system is “characterised by a high degree
of awareness among data controllers of their obligations, and among data subjects
of their rights.”71 Of course, the existence of effective sanctions and/or direct ver-
ification by independent public authorities goes a long way toward creating such a
good system.72
Since the APEC Framework is neither legally enforceable on its own accord,
nor creates any independent data protection authorities, does it, nonetheless, have
the potential for creating good rule compliance? Again, we must consider a hypo-
thetical scenario in which an APEC Member economy implements the APEC
Framework as domestic legislation. Part IV of the APEC Framework outlines vari-
ous options that Member economies might take in implementing the Principles, and
gives tremendous deference to whichever means an individual Member economy
might feel is most appropriate, including the use of central authorities, multi-
agency enforcement bodies, self-regulation via a network of designated industry
bodies, or any combination thereof.73 Flexibility is the name of the game, and so
there is no guarantee that a Member economy that did incorporate the APEC
Framework into domestic law would create a system that ensured effective rule
compliance.
The APEC Framework fails to identify any specific administrative or criminal
sanctions, though it does note that there should be “remedial measures . . . propor-
tionate to the likelihood and severity of the harm” caused by inappropriate collec-
71 WP Working Document, supra note 50 at 7.
72 WP Opinion on Argentina, supra note 61 at 13–16.
73 APEC Framework, supra note 3, Part iv(A)(31).
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tion or use of personal information.74 Indeed, the APEC Framework shies away
from encouraging the creation of robust sanctions, suggesting only that systems for
providing privacy protections may include rights of legal enforcement.75 There is,
however, recognition in the APEC Framework that it must be known and accessible
for it to have any meaningful effect and, to this end, suggests that Member econo-
mies ought to publicise the relevant privacy protections to the citizenry, educate
data controllers about the protections, and educate individuals as to how they can
exercise their rights.76
Of course, this is merely a hypothetical scenario and it is impossible to judge
effective compliance with the rules until they are domestically incorporated on
some level. However, one can make the broad proposition that the lack of any re-
quired enforcement mechanisms is likely to undercut the potential the APEC
Framework has for ensuring good compliance with the substantive rules, and this is
likely to militate against a future finding of adequacy.
(ii) Provision of Assistance to Individual Data Subjects
The Working Party has said that it is a fundamental requirement of an ade-
quate data protection regime that individuals be able to enforce their rights in a
prompt and effective manner, and not be burdened by undue costs in doing so.
There must be an independent institutional mechanism that data subjects can utilize
in order to enforce their rights.
While the APEC Framework requires that the Principles it contains be known
and accessible, and while this may indeed help individuals exercise their rights, it
falls far short of the institutional requirement spoken of by the Working Party.
While a central authority could theoretically be used to implement the APEC
Framework’s principles, it is not required as such, and the APEC Framework
stresses that different Member economies may “determine that different [Princi-
ples] may call for different means of implementation” and, therefore, it is important
to be “respectful of the requirements of [Member economies].”77
(iii) Provision of Appropriate Redress
The Working Party has identified the capability of a data protection regime to
provide appropriate redress to the injured party following breach of the rules to be a
“key element”; one which “must involve a system of independent adjudication or
arbitration” that can either provide compensation or impose sanctions.78 The APEC
Framework does not require the creation of such an independent system, and spe-
cifically provides for flexibility in implementation, as mentioned above. However,
the Working Party has accepted that the absence of specific rules regarding redress
in a data protection regime may, nonetheless, be acceptable where there are residual
74 Ibid., Part iii(I)(14).
75 Ibid., Part iv(A)(38).
76 Ibid., Part iv(A)(36).
77 Ibid., Part iv(A)(32).
78 WP Working Document, supra note 50 at 7.
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legal principles that effectively fill the gap.79 Therefore, it is possible that the
APEC Member economies could implement the APEC Framework and still be ca-
pable of providing appropriate redress in situations of rule violation, but, again,
there is simply no guarantee that this would be the case.
(c) Concluding Analysis
While the APEC Framework does meet some of the core substantive require-
ments (notably data quality/proportionality and data security) outlined by the
Working Party, it is lacking in several key areas that, were it to be implemented as
domestic legislation, mean it ought not to be considered “adequate” within the
meaning of Article 25. The major flaw to the substantive content provisions is a
series of overbroad or ill-advised exemptions. The Working Party requires that ex-
emptions to the requirements of the core principles be limited in nature, such as
those that deal with national security or public policy concerns. In contrast, the
APEC Framework creates exemptions in a broader array of circumstances, reflect-
ing its generally market-driven approach.
With regard to the Working Party’s core procedural requirements, the APEC
Framework fares even worse. There is no requirement for incorporation of any of
its substantive Principles directly into the laws of APEC Member economies. Even
if one were to proceed under a hypothetical scenario of the entire Framework being
implemented as domestic legislation, there is still no requirement for an indepen-
dent data authority, nor is there a requirement for an institutional system of adjudi-
cation in order to allow individuals to exercise their rights. While, in theory, an
APEC Member economy could implement the APEC Framework and “upgrade”
the provisions to meet the adequacy standard through the creation of additional
rules and procedures, that potential is not enough for the APEC Framework or any
legislation modeled upon it to, standing alone, be considered “adequate” by any
stretch of the imagination.
The lack of procedural guarantees and relatively weak substantive provisions
in the APEC Framework is consistent with its general approach to informational
privacy — the APEC Framework treats it as a useful regulatory tool for consumers
in a market environment, one that can be beneficial in economic terms by increas-
ing consumer confidence. As such, any privacy rules rights are to be balanced
against the economic benefits of the free-flow of that personal information. If the
calculation, by an APEC Member economy, is that robust privacy regulation has
adverse consequences for business, we are unlikely to see the adoption of any sort
of “adequate” data protection regime. This market-oriented approach helps explain
why the APEC Framework has been described as “the weakest international pri-
vacy standard yet developed.”80 According to its own guidelines for implementa-
tion, the basic concept behind the APEC Framework’s principles is that “econo-
mies [have an interest] in maximising the economic and social benefits available to
their citizens and businesses.” The APEC Framework thereby eschews the lan-
guage of rights in favour of the language of markets, placing informational privacy
79 WP Opinion on Argentina, supra note 61 at 13–16.
80 Graham Greenleaf, “APEC Privacy Framework Completed: No Threat to Privacy Stan-
dard” (2006) 11 Privacy Law and Policy Reporter 5 at 7.
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and the benefits of cross-border data flows on an equal conceptual level.81 In con-
trast, the Directive approaches the issue from a rights-based “privacy first” perspec-
tive — the Preamble states that “data-processing systems are designed to serve
man” and “the object of the national laws on the processing of personal data is to
protect fundamental rights and freedoms, notably the right to privacy.”82
The APEC Framework is indeterminate and non-prescriptive, probably out of
political necessity since APEC “has no treaty obligations required of its participants
. . . and [its] commitments are undertaken on a voluntary basis.”83 Interpretation
across Member economies that do eventually implement the APEC Framework into
their domestic legislation will likely differ greatly. Indeed, this is what happened
following the adoption of the OECD Principles in 1981; the general wording of the
principles (strikingly similar to the APEC Framework, in fact) led to differing inter-
pretations, thus, largely defeating the idea of creating an international document in
the first place. The US went in the direction of industry self-regulation, while Eu-
rope developed a more rigorous legislative approach. Of course, the European ex-
perience was in the context of an increasingly politically and economically inte-
grated community, unlike APEC. As such, there is less likely to be a unified
interest in creating binding standards across the APEC economies. Indeed, the ex-
isting differences between the protections offered by the Member economies are
perhaps reflective of this. It may simply be that the APEC Framework is the best
that can be done with such a diverse group of states. Even so, this is not an argu-
ment in favour of the Working Party accepting those low standards as “adequate.”
The APEC Framework cannot meet the Working Party’s requirement of “ade-
quacy” within the meaning of Article 25 of the Directive even if one imagines a
hypothetical scenario in which it were incorporated fully into the domestic legisla-
tion of an APEC Member economy as its data protection regime. This article’s
analysis demonstrates that the APEC Framework is lacking, in both substantive and
procedural terms. Any data protection regime adopted by an APEC Member econ-
omy could only be considered adequate if it developed a set of privacy rules that,
while possibly based on the APEC Framework, went significantly beyond its mini-
mal requirements. Yet, in 2000, the Commission appeared to bow to economic
pressures and declared as “adequate” a set of American principles that also seemed
to reflect a market-driven understanding of informational privacy and lacked strong
procedural guarantees. Does that experience provide an applicable lesson for pro-
ponents of the APEC Framework?
81 APEC Framework, supra note 3, Part iv(A)(29-30).
82 Directive, supra note 2, 2nd and 10th recitals.
83 APEC, About APEC, online: APEC <http://www.apec.org/apec/about_apec.html>.
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V. ANALYSIS: COULD THE APEC FRAMEWORK BE
RECONCEIVED AS ANOTHER “SAFE HARBOR”?
(a) Safe Harbor
The US Department of Commerce and the European Commission agreed in
2000 to the Safe Harbor84 privacy principles in response to concerns that the differ-
ing approach (market-driven, relying on industrial self-regulation) taken to privacy
issues in the US would result in a finding of inadequacy and a halt to transfers of
data. There was tremendous pressure from corporate America on the Department of
Commerce to “block the Directive,”85 and the result was a set of principles that is
generally favourable to business, but one that is, nonetheless, approved by the
Commission.
The Safe Harbor approach is fundamentally different than that taken by other
nations wishing to meet the adequacy requirement. Canada and Argentina, for ex-
ample, both developed comprehensive national legislation that matched the core
principles of the Directive. In contrast, Safe Harbor does not create blanket ade-
quacy for the US as a whole. Instead, it is a list of seven general principles, along
with further explanatory details attached to the instrument as “frequently asked
questions” or FAQ. Despite its name, the FAQ form as much a part of Safe Harbor
as the original seven principles. American organisations can self-certify as meeting
the requirements of Safe Harbor by submitting a declaration to the Department of
Commerce,86 at which point they will be considered as having guaranteed “ade-
quate” safeguards, and can thus begin to receive and process any European data
they receive. Interestingly, Safe Harbor is irrelevant to the processing of the per-
sonal data of Americans; it is strictly related to the receipt of European data flows.
The thrust of the whole Safe Harbor arrangement is, therefore, entirely different
than that of the European Union. The Directive requires the implementation of
comprehensive national legislation that provides for robust data protections, over-
seen by independent data commissioners. Like the APEC Framework, Safe Harbor
studiously avoids framing informational privacy as a “right”; it is an approach wary
of significant government involvement in creating privacy regulations that might
pose an excessive burden to business. This is, of course, consistent with the tradi-
tional market-oriented approach taken in the United States, which assumes that, in
large part, industries have the ability to regulate themselves, and that “privacy” can
be a value-added service like any other for which consumers can choose to pay.
(b) The APEC Framework as another “Safe Harbor”?
This article has argued that the APEC Framework does not deserve to be ac-
corded “adequacy” status under the Working Party’s standard principles were it to
be implemented as domestic legislation; but, might it be possible that an alternate
route to the finding of “adequacy” could be found in a Safe Harbor-style approach?
84 US Department of Commerce, Safe Harbor Privacy Principles (2001), online: Ex-
port.gov <http://www.export.gov/safeharbor/eu/eg_main_018475.asp> [Safe Harbor].
85 Reidenberg, supra note 1 at 740.
86 US Department of Commerce, Checklist for Self-Certification, online: Export.gov
<http://www.export.gov/safeharbor/eu/eg_main_018483.asp>.
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In other words, could the APEC Framework be reconceived of as list of principles
to which APEC-based organisations could sign up in order to receive flows of Eu-
ropean data? Safe Harbor, after all, was the product of a series of back and forth
negotiations over a period of several years.87 This dialogue resulted in a compro-
mise approach between the US and the EU, with the Working Party making clear
its concerns as to the original proposals and the Department of Commerce respond-
ing with new proposals or modifications. The compromise seems to have centred
on the WP lowering its expectations for the substantive principles in exchange for
stronger procedural guarantees. For example, the creation of the FAQs, which
greatly clarify how Safe Harbor is to operate in practice, was entirely the result of
institutional dialogue across the Atlantic — they were nowhere to be found in the
original proposals, but grew steadily in detail and in number after first being intro-
duced. The FAQs now are considered to be on par with the Principles as part of the
provisions of Safe Harbor.
The US legislative approach (or lack thereof) to the protection of personal
privacy, with regard to personal data, never would have been approved by the
Working Party, but the economic importance of transnational data flows to both
sides led to a keen interest in a compromise. Both the Safe Harbor agreement and
the APEC Framework seem to place trust in the ability of industry to self-regulate
in the interests of consumer privacy, and both trace their core principles to the
OECD Privacy Guidelines of the early 1980s. It might, therefore, be possible for
negotiations between the EU and APEC to be opened with the hopes of reaching a
similar type of compromise.
Reworking the APEC Framework to look more like Safe Harbor would re-
quire some significant changes. At this point, the APEC Framework is set up to
create minimum thresholds that Member economies are encouraged to implement
domestically through national legislation. In contrast, Safe Harbor is not composed
of a national set of laws that apply to all entities processing information in the US,
but rather a list of principles to which organisations can voluntarily subscribe, spe-
cifically to receive European data. If the APEC Framework were reworked in this
way, it could potentially be an effective way of encouraging the adoption of better
privacy standards amongst the larger corporations operating in the region, who cur-
rently have no obligation to follow the principles of the APEC Framework unless
their domestic governments legislate them to do so. The encouragement would be
in the form of relatively easy access to valuable European data flows, upon certifi-
cation. An increased flow of information (adequately protected, of course) between
Europe and Asia is certainly a positive outcome, in economic terms.
So, negotiations might conceivably lead to tighter substantive provisions and a
focus on organisations rather than Member economies. However, this still leaves
unconsidered the greatest weakness in the APEC Framework — an almost com-
plete lack of effective or detailed procedural mechanisms that ensure individuals
87 See e.g. European Commission (Working Party on the Protection of Individuals with
Regard to the Processing of Personal Data), Working document on the current state of
play of the ongoing discussions between the European Commission and the United
States Government concerning the “International Safe Harbor Principles” (1999)
5075/99/EN/final, online: European Commission
<http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/docs/wpdocs/1999/wp23_en.pdf>.
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can enforce their rights. Under Safe Harbor, organisations have to explicitly agree,
as part of the certification process, to accept the enforcement jurisdiction of the
FTC if they fail to live up to their privacy obligations. The challenge here would be
to ensure that each APEC Member economy had an institution that is as effective
and as capable as the FTC in enforcing these rights. Naturally, this is more of a
challenge in some states than others, depending on their level of development but,
in any event, building this sort of institutional capacity is something that is difficult
to achieve through negotiation alone. Furthermore, it is unclear whether some of
the APEC Members with a less robust history of democracy might be convinced to
create an institutional framework to enforce privacy rights of citizens even as
against corporations. States that tend towards a more authoritarian governing style
may also be concerned about any potential knock-on effect of acknowledging a
right to privacy, regardless of the context in which it is originally granted.
While the APEC Framework is still a significant distance from the Working
Party’s core principles, it is important to remember that it is the Commission that
makes the final recommendation as to “adequacy” status. Indeed, even in its final
report to the Commission on Safe Harbor, the Working Party expressed reserva-
tions about whether the updated principles and FAQs truly met the requirements of
the Directive.88 At the same time, there was tremendous pressure on the Commis-
sion to approve the Safe Harbor agreement, both from European businesses and
from some European member states themselves, who, at that time (2000), had not
implemented the Directive themselves, still being in the three-year grace period.89
It is possible, then, that the Commission could face similar pressure to negotiate
with APEC to create a new approach similar to that of Safe Harbor, and it is
equally possible that these negotiations could lead to improvements in some areas
in which that Framework is inadequate, and to compromises in others.
(c) Criticisms of a “Safe Harbor” Approach
While the idea of an APEC Framework reworked along the lines of Safe Har-
bor might seem attractive in some ways, it ought to be rejected on two grounds.
First, the concept of such a self-certifying regime has proven ineffective in practice.
Second, and perhaps more serious, agreeing to another “Safe Harbor”-style agree-
ment for economic reasons threatens to weaken the normative core of the Directive
and the potential it has as a global trigger for the spread of strong data privacy
rights.
Five years after the issuance of the Safe Harbor principles, they had achieved
limited relevance in the US. By 2005, less than 800 American corporations had
signed up, less than 10% of these were in the “Fortune 500,” and not a single en-
88 European Commission (Working Party on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to
the Processing of Personal Data), Opinion 4/2000 on the level of protection provided by
the “Safe Harbor Principles” (2000) CA07/434/00/EN [WP Opinion on Safe Harbor].
89 Gregory Shaffer, “Globalization and Social Protection: The Impact of the EU and In-
ternational Rules in Ratcheting Up of U.S. Privacy Standards” (2000) 25 Yale J. Int’l
L. 1 at 44-45, cited in Reidenberg, supra note 1.
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forcement action had been taken against a Safe Harbor member.90 The Commission
itself has declared the slow uptake of Safe Harbor to be “a cause of disappoint-
ment.”91 Worse still, even when dealing with organisations that have subscribed to
Safe Harbor, individuals may still be putting their personal information at risk. Safe
Harbor tasks multiple “seal organisations” with dispute resolution, and yet only one
of these proposes direct remedies to victims of privacy breaches. This is unlikely to
change so long as the membership lists of those in the industry overseeing dispute
resolution continue to “look like a ‘Who’s Who’ of privacy scandal-plagued com-
panies.”92 In its own report evaluating the effectiveness of Safe Harbor four years
after its implementation, the Commission found that “a relevant number” of self-
certified companies had difficulties in putting the principles of Safe Harbor into
practice, particularly in the areas of notice, choice, access, and enforcement, and so
recommended that the FTC be more proactive in monitoring compliance.93 Indus-
try self-regulation in the area of privacy seems to have failed comprehensively,
suggesting that an enforceable rights-based approach, like that of the Directive, is
the better strategy.
Of greater concern is that if another Safe Harbor-style approach contained the
same substantive and procedural weaknesses as the original, it might threaten the
normative core of the Directive and its ability to trigger stronger protections glob-
ally through the operation of Article 25. The onward transfer provision of Article
25 has helped encourage the development of more robust data protection regimes in
several countries, including Canada, Argentina, and Switzerland. Perhaps the
Working Party recognised the threat that Safe Harbor represented to this process
when it encouraged the Commission to “bear in mind the consequences of any ade-
quacy finding [of Safe Harbor] for future negotiations in international forums.”94
The Commission itself is also apparently conscious of this, and was careful to note
in its decision finally approving Safe Harbor that it did not constitute any sort of
legal precedent for findings of adequacy.95
Yet, it is hard to ignore the practical principle that came from finding Safe
Harbor “adequate” —  that where sufficient economic clout is present, the Com-
90 Jay Cline, “Roadmap for International Safe Harbor Framework” (2006) 20:3 Int’l. Rev.
L. Comp. & Tech 361 at 362.
91 European Commission, The Implementation of Commission Decision 520/2000/EC on
the adequate protection of personal data provided by the Safe Harbor privacy princi-
ples and related Frequently Asked Questions issued by the US Department of Com-
merce (2004) SEC (2004) 1323 at 5, online: European Commission
<http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/docs/adequacy/sec-2004-1323_en.pdf>
[Implementation of Commission Decision].
92 Reidenberg, supra note 1 at 745.
93 Implementation of Commission Decision, supra note 91 at 7–13.
94 WP Opinion on Safe Harbor, supra note 88 at 2.
95 European Commission, Commission Decision of 26 July 2000 pursuant to Directive
95/46/C of the European Parliament and of the Council on the adequacy of the protec-
tion provided by the Safe Harbor privacy principles and related Frequently Asked
Questions issued by the US Department of Commerce 2000/520/EC, Article 2, online:
European Commission <http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32000D0520:EN:HTML>
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mission will look for “acceptability” rather than “adequacy.” The very purpose of
Article 25 is to ensure that personal information of residents of the EU remains
protected even when it is transferred beyond the borders of the Union. Watering
“adequate” down to something like “acceptable” in certain cases undermines the
protection Article 25 was intended to ensure, and sends the wrong message to or-
ganisations and States seeking to work with European data. Encouraging APEC to
modify the APEC Framework in order to convert it to something resembling Safe
Harbor would continue to send the wrong message, and would likely make it in-
creasingly difficult for the EU to encourage widespread adoption of robust data
protection laws around the world through the carrot and stick combination of Arti-
cle 25.
CONCLUSION
The APEC Framework and the EU Data Protection Directive offer two differ-
ent normative conceptions of informational or data privacy. The former treats it as
something that can be useful in correcting market failures and increasing consumer
confidence and, as such, can more readily be balanced against economic interests.
In contrast, the latter sees it as a fundamental human right tied to notions of human
dignity and autonomy, and so cannot easily be restricted. These differing concep-
tions reveal themselves in both the substantive and procedural protections (and re-
lated exemptions) each regime grants. When one views the APEC Framework
through the lens of the Working Party’s own approach to findings of adequacy
within the meaning of Article 25 of the Directive, it is clearly lacking. Were the
APEC Framework ever to be implemented (without significant modification from
the structure outlined herein) as domestic data protection legislation in an APEC
Member economy, the Commission ought to reject any application for “adequacy.”
While APEC is not exclusively composed of developing economies, it none-
theless has the potential for enormous economic growth relative to Europe over the
next twenty-five years. As APEC’s economic clout increases, the Commission may
again find itself pressured from interests both inside and outside the EU to reduce
the protections given to transfers of personal data outside the borders of the Union;
this would be unfortunate. Any idea of opening negotiations with APEC with an
eye to converting the APEC Framework to something resembling Safe Harbor
ought to be rejected, for it, too, would likely fail to guarantee the requisite protec-
tions of the Directive to European data.
The EU has developed some of the world’s most rigorous privacy protections
for personal data, and ought not to bend them purely for economic reasons. Article
25 of the Directive has directly influenced the development of more rigorous data
protection standards in other nations and (given sufficient support by the European
Commission) has the potential to continue to do so. It can continue to serve as a
beacon for States interested both in doing business with Europe and interested in
protecting the privacy of their own citizens. While Article 25 of the Directive does
not require the latter, meeting its requirements in order to keep the flow of Euro-
pean data uninterrupted tends to, nonetheless, have that effect as democratic gov-
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ernments are unlikely to choose to require greater protection for the data of foreign-
ers rather that that of their own citizens.96
Accepting the APEC Privacy Framework as a model for global consensus
would be unquestionably beneficial for organisations in the “business of informa-
tion,” but would be a step backwards for a conception of informational or data
privacy as a fundamental right, and ought to, therefore, be rejected. 
96 The anomalous experience of “Safe Harbor” notwithstanding.
